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ABSTRACT
We argue that the emergence of a well-developed market for patented technologies over the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries facilitated the emergence of a group of highly specialized and
productive inventors by making it possible for them to transfer to others responsibility for developing and
commercializing their inventions. The most basic of the institutional supports that made this market
possible was, of course, the patent system, which created secure and tradable property rights in invention.
But trade was also facilitated by the emergence of intermediaries who economized on the information
costs associated with assessing the value of inventions and helped to match sellers and buyers of patent
rights. Patent agents and lawyers were particularly well placed to provide these kinds of services, because
they were linked to similar attorneys in other parts of the country and because, in the course of their
regular business activities, they accumulated information about participants on both sides of the market
for technology. Our quantitative analysis of assignment contracts demonstrates that patentees whose
assignments were handled by these specialists produced more patents over their careers, assigned a greater
fraction of their patents, and also were able to find buyers for their inventions much more quickly than
other patentees. In other words, the development of institutions supporting market trade in patented
technology seems to have made it possible for creative individuals to specialize more fully in inventive
work -- that is, it seems to have set in motion the kind of Smithian processes that have generally been
associated with higher rates of productivity growth.
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The critical role played by intermediaries in the operation of financial markets is 
well known. Because entrepreneurs often lack sufficient savings to finance their ventures 
on their own and people with savings often do not have projects that will put their funds 
to profitable use, there are significant benefits to be derived from trades in which savers 
transfer funds to entrepreneurs in return for income in the form of interest or dividend 
payments.  The problem, however, is that high transactions costs may prevent such 
mutually advantageous exchanges from occurring.  Because it is costly for savers to 
assess the prospects of each entrepreneurial project, or conversely for entrepreneurs to 
convince savers individually of the merits of their ventures, many good (if risky) projects 
may be starved for support, while savings get channeled to more conventional, easier to 
evaluate, investments.  Intermediaries can significantly reduce this problem by 
mobilizing and pooling resources from savers, and investigating the creditworthiness of 
alternative investment opportunities on their behalf.  By thus economizing on information 
costs, intermediaries increase the efficiency with which existing savings are employed to 
support economic development.  Moreover, because their activities raise the return to 
saving in the economy as a whole, they also have a positive effect on the pool of 
available investment funds.
1 
Similar kinds of transaction costs can impede both the generation and exploitation 
of technological knowledge.  In the first place, the individuals who come up with ideas 
for new products or processes often need capital from outside investors in order to 
transform their visions into workable inventions.  They thus face financing problems 
analogous to those of traditional entrepreneurs.  In addition, because the comparative 
                                                           
1 Lance Davis and Robert Gallman, "Capital Formation in the United States During the Nineteenth 
Century," in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 7, part II, eds. P. Mathias and M.M. Postan   4
advantage of inventors typically stems from their creativity or specific knowledge, any 
time and resources they are compelled to devote to developing and commercializing their 
inventions may be relatively unproductively spent; indeed, they may, in fact, be poorly 
suited for these tasks. As a consequence, there are potential advantages to exchanges in 
which inventors sell or license the rights to the new technologies they have created to 
others better able to exploit their commercial potential.  The problem, however, is that it 
is extremely costly for would-be buyers or lessors to assess the worth of the many and 
varied ideas that inventors devise. As in the case of financial markets, therefore, one 
might reasonably expect specialized intermediaries to emerge to economize on 
assessment costs and improve allocative efficiency.
2 
During the early twentieth century, large firms as diverse as General Electric, 
DuPont, and General Motors began to build in-house R&D laboratories. The apparent 
success of these investments, and the spread of this model to other important firms 
throughout the economy, led scholars to posit that vertical integration was a solution to 
the information problems associated with the market exchange of technological 
information.  Indeed, some went so far as to argue that the development of complex 
technologies depended on the movement of R&D inside large, managerially coordinated 
enterprises.
3  Recent events, however, have brought this view increasingly into doubt.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Cambridge, ENG: Cambridge University Press, 1978).  
2 Although they do not discuss the technology sector, Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky and 
Gary Biglaiser have provided theoretical rationales for the emergence of middlemen in industries with 
similar types of matching and assessment problems.  See Rubinstein and Wolinsky, “Middlemen,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (Aug. 1987), pp. 581-94; and Biglaiser, “Middlemen as Experts,” 
Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (Summer 1993), pp. 212-23. 
3 See David J. Teece, “Technological Change and the Nature of the Firm,” in Technical Change 
and Economic Theory, ed. Giovanni Dosi, et al. (London:  Pinter, 1988), pp. 256-81; David C. Mowery, 
“The Relationship between Intrafirm and Contractual Forms of Industrial Research in American 
Manufacturing, 1900-1940,” Explorations in Economic History, 20 (October 1983), pp. 351-74; and “The 
Boundaries of the U.S. firm in R&D,” in Coordination and Information:  Historical Perspectives on the 
Organization of Enterprise, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Daniel M. G. Raff (Chicago:  University of   5
Many large firms have reduced or even eliminated their research operations, and venture 
capital has flowed to smaller enterprises that focus on inventive activity and sell or license 
the resulting intellectual property—not infrequently to the same firms that earlier had built 
their own in-house labs.
4  These developments, which intriguingly have been most 
prominent in the “high-tech” sectors of the economy, mark a return, we argue, to an earlier 
pattern that scholars have neglected, perhaps because of their preoccupation with the rise of 
big business.  As we show, over the course of the nineteenth century there was a 
tremendous expansion of market trade in technology that facilitated a division of labor 
across (rather than within) organizations between those who generated and those who 
exploited new technological knowledge.  By enabling, indeed encouraging, creative but 
ambitious inventors to focus on what they did best, this division of labor gave rise to the 
most technologically fertile period in American history, at least as measured by patents 
issued on a per capita basis (see Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
In this article we examine some of the mechanisms through which this market for 
technology operated.  We show that the U.S. patent system created a framework that 
supported trade in technology, and that the patent agents and lawyers who serviced this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 147-76; and Richard Zeckhauser, “The Challenge of Contracting for 
Technological Information,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 93 (Nov. 1996), pp. 12743-
8. Earlier scholars were more likely to attribute the success of these labs to the benefits of putting together 
teams of researchers to work systematically on technological problems.  See, for example, Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942); Alfred P. Sloan, My Years 
at General Motors, eds. John McDonald and Catharine Stevens (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964); and John 
Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975). 
4 The principal explanations offered thus far for this change have focused on the effects of 
increases in the security of intellectual property rights and of expanded access to venture capital.  For 
examples, see Josh Lerner and Robert Merges, “The Control of Strategic Alliances: An Empirical Analysis 
of the Biotechnology Industry,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 46 (March 1998), pp. 125-156; and 
Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern, “Incumbency and R & D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative 
Destruction,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming.  For a general theoretical   6
system often took on the functions of intermediaries, matching inventors seeking capital 
with investors seeking profitable outlets for their funds and also inventors seeking to sell 
new technological ideas with buyers eager to develop and commercialize them. Through 
systematic analysis of samples drawn from the Patent Office’s manuscript records of 
patent sales and from other official sources, we explore the effect of these intermediaries 
on patentees’ access to, and use of, the market for technology.  Our findings suggest that 
intermediaries appear to have the lowered transactions costs and improved the efficiency 
of exchange and that, as one might expect, inventors who were most specialized in 
patenting and most likely to sell off the rights to their intellectual property were the ones 
who made the most intensive use of intermediaries.  We also provide evidence in support 
of the idea that the increased ability to extract returns from invention by selling off patent 
rights was in fact associated with a growing division of labor that enabled talented 
inventors to devote a greater proportion of their time and resources to creative work.  In 
the final section of the article, we draw on a particularly rich set of papers for one patent 
attorney, Edward Van Winkle, to develop a more complete picture of what services these 
intermediaries provided to support the market for technology.  Although Van Winkle’s 
activities may not have been representative of patent attorneys in general, his papers open 
a window on a world that hitherto had been largely unknown—a world in which at least 
some patent attorneys played key informational roles at the center of overlapping groups 
of businessmen who were in effect operating much like modern-day venture capitalists, 
investing in new technologies and financing high-tech startups. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
treatment, see Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, “The Management of Innovation, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 109 (Nov. 1994), pp. 1185-1210.   7
The U.S. Patent System and the Sale of Patent Rights 
The patent system provided the institutional framework within which trade in 
technology evolved over the course of the nineteenth century.  Consciously designed with 
the aim of encouraging inventive activity—and thus technological progress—the U.S. 
system provided the inventor of a device with an exclusive property right for a fixed term 
of years.   Because patent rights were transferable assets, inventors who did not wish to 
exploit their inventions themselves could sell (assign) or lease (license) the rights to 
others.
5 Moreover, because a patent could be awarded only to the “first and true” inventor 
of a device, sellers of new technologies could reveal information to potential buyers at an 
early stage and still be protected against the possibility that someone else would patent 
their ideas.   
Of course, this protection and, more generally, the ability of inventors to find 
buyers or licensees for their patents depended on the security of these property rights.  
From the beginning the law left responsibility for enforcing patents to the federal courts, 
and as Zorina Khan has shown, judges quickly evolved an effective set of principles for 
protecting the rights of patentees and also of those who purchased or licensed patented 
technologies.  Subsequent legislation in 1836 instituted an examination system under 
which, before granting patents, technical experts scrutinized applications for novelty and 
for the appropriateness of claims about invention.  This procedure made patent rights 
more secure by increasing the likelihood that a grant for a specified technology would 
                                                           
5 One important feature of the law was the requirement that patentees be individual men or 
women.  Firms could not be awarded patents for ideas developed in their shops but could obtain the rights 
by assignment.   8
survive a court challenge, and may also have provided some signal about the significance 
of the new technology.  Thereafter, both patenting and sales of patent rights boomed.
6    
Although the main purpose of the patent system was to stimulate invention by 
granting creative individuals secure rights to their intellectual property, another important 
goal was to promote the diffusion of technological knowledge. The law required 
patentees to provide the Patent Office with detailed specifications for their inventions 
(including, where appropriate, working models), and the result was a central storehouse 
of information that was open to all. Anyone could journey to Washington and research 
others’ inventions in the Patent Office files.  In addition, more convenient means of 
tapping this rich source of information soon developed.  The Patent Office itself opened 
branch offices around the country and published on a regular basis lists (some with 
descriptions of specifications and drawings) of the patents it granted. By the middle of 
the century, moreover, a number of private journals had emerged to improve upon these 
official services. One of the most important was Scientific American, published by Munn 
and Company, the largest patent agency of the nineteenth century.  Others included the 
American Artisan, published by the patent agency Brown, Coombs & Company; the 
American Inventor, by the American Patent Agency; and the Patent Right Gazette, by the 
United States Patent Right Association (which, despite its name, functioned as a general 
patent agency).  Covering the full spectrum of technologies, these journals featured 
articles about important new inventions, printed complete lists of patents issued, and 
offered to provide readers with copies of patent specifications for a small fee. Over time, 
                                                           
6 See B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Patent Institutions, Industrial Organization, and 
Early Technological Change:  Britain and the United States, 1790-1850,” in Technological Revolutions in 
Europe:  Historical Perspectives, ed. Maxine Berg and Kristine Bruland (Cheltenham, UK:  Edward Elgar,   9
the scope and number of these periodicals increased, reflecting an expanding and ever 
more articulated demand for information about new technologies. Moreover, specialized 
trade journals also appeared to report on developments in particular industries.  The 
Journal of the Society of Glass Technology, for example, provided detailed descriptions 
of all patents taken out in the United States and Britain that were relevant to the 
manufacture of glass. 
In addition to disseminating information about new technologies, these 
periodicals provided a forum for those seeking to sell rights in patents. The Patent Record 
and Monthly Review, for example, featured lists of “Inventions and Patents for Sale” and 
of “Partners Wanted:  Capital Wanted to Develop these Inventions.”  The inventions 
described in these columns ranged from the simple (curtain fastener, clothes line reel, can 
opener) to the complex (automatic street railway switch, rotary engine, flying machine).
7  
Moreover, the texts of these brief advertisements suggest that inventors felt secure 
enough in their intellectual property actively to seek buyers for their inventions before 
they secured the protection of patents.  The very titles of these lists (for example, 
“Inventions and Patents for Sale”) provide evidence for this claim, as do the many 
advertisements that did not include patent numbers.
8  Because, all other things being 
equal, having a patent already in hand should have raised the value of the invention in the 
eyes of prospective buyers, it is reasonable to conclude that most of the inventions listed 
without patent numbers had not yet been protected in this manner.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
1997), pp. 292-313; and Khan, “Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century 
America,” Journal of Economic History, 55 (Mar. 1995), pp. 58-97. 
7 This particular journal claimed that its mission was “to bring the capitalist and inventor together 
for mutual benefit.”  It earned revenues from advertisements placed by both buyers and sellers of 
inventions.  See The Patent Record and Monthly Review, New Series, 3 (Jan.-Feb. 1902), p. 47. 
8 See, for example, the lists in The Patent Record and Monthly Review, New Series, 3 (May 1902), 
p. 32.   10
It is, of course, difficult to know how effective any of these advertisements were, 
but the advice manuals that targeted audiences of inventors at this time generally agreed 
that such methods could work if they were coupled with other efforts.  The best option “if 
the inventor [could] afford it” was to have the invention “illustrated and described in one 
or more of the scientific and mechanical publications of the day,” like Scientific 
American or the American Artisan.  But if the inventor did not have sufficient resources, 
it was still effective, the manuals claimed, to put a notice in the “regular advertising 
columns,” especially if one took care to choose specialized publications that would “meet 
the eye of the class or classes of persons to whom the invention is of special interest.”
9 In 
addition, however, the patentee was advised to prepare a circular describing his invention 
and its potential market, to procure a list of businesses most likely to be interested in the 
invention, and to mail the circular to these firms.  He should then follow up these 
circulars with personal solicitations.
10 
Marketing a patent in this way was not only expensive but time consuming, and it 
distracted an inventor from more creative tasks.  Not surprisingly, therefore, these 
publications also contained advertisements from individuals and companies offering to 
handle the sale of patent rights for inventors.  For example, one issue of The Patent 
Record included advertisements from Dr. J. O. White of Philadelphia asserting that he 
had “excellent facilities for placing a valuable patent, suited to that market, in Europe”; 
from Messrs. Comere & Co. announcing, “We have several customers wanting to 
                                                           
9 William Edgar Simonds, Practical Suggestions on the Sale of Patents (Hartford, Conn.: privately 
printed, 1871), pp. 24-5; F. A. Cresee, Practical Pointers for Patentees, Containing Valuable Information 
and Advice on the Sale of Patents (New York:  Munn & Co., 1907), pp. 46-52. 
10 The quotes are from Simonds, Practical Suggestions on the Sale of Patents, pp. 19-28; but for 
additional examples, see W. B. Hutchinson and J. A. E. Criswell, Patents and How to Make Money Out of 
Them (New York:  D. Van Nostrand, 1899); An Experienced and Successful Inventor, Inventor’s Manual:    11
purchase patented articles suited to the mail-order trade”; from the International Patent 
Promotion Company of Cleveland claiming, “We have a large number of good patents 
for sale and would be pleased to have you call your attention to this fact in your paper”; 
and from the Wouther Patent Promoting Co. of Roswell, Georgia declaring that “We 
promote patents, and if there are any inventors desiring their inventions promoted, would 
be glad to hear from them.”
11  
More important, the patent agencies that published these kinds of journals were 
themselves in the business of buying and selling patents and, indeed, often saw their 
publications as means to solicit inventions. Hence the U.S. Patent Right Association used 
the pages of its Patent Right Gazette to tell inventors that it was the best agent to choose 
“if you wish to dispose of a Patent with the greatest possible certainty, in the shortest 
time and at its full value.”
12  Similarly, the American Patent Agency heavily advertised 
the patent selling arm of its business in the American Inventor, crowing that it was “the 
only Agency for the sale of patents in America that has two PRINCIPAL OFFICES and 
permanent branch offices in all the prominent cities of the Union.
13  Although Munn and 
Company and Brown, Coombs and Company, the publishers respectively of Scientific 
American and the American Artisan (the two leading journals in the field), may not have 
so explicitly advertised such services, they too were functioning as intermediaries.  An 
examination of manuscript assignment records for the years preceding and following the 
Civil War suggests that Munn and Company alone served as correspondent for roughly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
How to Work a Patent To Make It Pay (Rev. ed.; New York:  Norman W. Henly & Co., 1901); and Cresee, 
Practical Pointers for Patentees. 
11 The Patent Record and Monthly Review, New Series, 3 (May 1902), p. 33. 
12 See, for example, the cover pages of The Patent Right Gazette, 3 (July 1872) 
13 See, for example, American Inventor, 6 (Jan. 1883), p. 23.   12
15 percent of all of the contracts for the sale of patents recorded by the Patent Office in 
1866, though by the mid 1870s its share had dropped to less than five percent.
14 
Beginning around this same time, advice manuals increasingly warned inventors 
to stay away from intermediaries who advertised in trade publications or mailed out 
circulars soliciting their business. Such agents, the writers of the manuals claimed, “are 
unreliable and seek only to get what money they can from the patentee.  It is seldom 
indeed that most of them effect a sale.” Although agents typically advertised that they 
sold patents on commission, they often charged up-front fees ranging from $25 to $250 to 
cover advertising costs.  Patentees, therefore, bore relatively high costs with little 
assurance of return.  Indeed, one writer went so far as to claim, “from long experience 
and observation,” that he had “never known where a patentee was ever materially 
benefited by placing his interests in the hands of these concerns.” He went on to assert 
that “very few of these concerns have any facilities whatever for selling patents,” all of 
their time being taken up in “working inventors up to the remitting point which usually 
ends the matter so far as they are concerned.”
15   
                                                           
14 These figures are based on an examination (for patentees whose surnames began with the letter 
“B”) of the manuscript digests of assignments kept by the Patent Office. For a more complete description 
of these records, see below.  The share for Munn and Co. appears to have increased from the 1840s and 
1850s to the period just after the Civil War, and then dropped off rather substantially. 
15 It is not entirely clear whether or not these advice manuals were including firms such as Munn 
& Co. among the agencies they were encouraging inventors to avoid. Probably not, given that these last 
quotes came from a pamphlet published by Munn & Co. It seems likely that, although their overall market 
share declined, firms like Munn & Co. were able to establish themselves as reputable enterprises, both 
because the journals they published were so prestigious and because they eschewed such questionable 
practices.  For example, in response to an inquiry from an agent offering a patent for sale, Brown, Coombs 
& Co, haughtily replied, “We [do] not interest ourselves in patents as a matter of speculation.” Letter of 3 
Dec. 1870 to Lemuel Jenks, Box 2, Folder 45, Mss. 867, Lemuel Jenks, 1844-1879, Baker Library, Harvard 
Graduate School of Business Administration.  For the warnings, see Cresee, Practical Pointers for 
Patentees, pp. 42-3; Hutchinson and Criswell, Patents and How to Make Money Out of Them, pp. 161-2; 
An Experienced and Successful Inventor, Inventor’s Manual, p. 61; and Simonds, Practical Suggestions on 
the Sale of Patents, pp. 7-9.   13
Rather than work through these kinds of agencies, inventors who needed help 
selling their patents were advised to seek the assistance of business people whom they 
knew they could trust.  Some of the men to whom inventors thus turned were local 
manufacturers or merchants whose enterprises were completely unrelated to the purpose 
of the invention.  Thus when James Edward Smith, a machinist and professional inventor, 
designed a cigar machine, he approached George E. Molleson, owner of a granite quarry 
and agent for marble producers, for help in getting “a practical moneyed man who 
understood the manufacture of cigars to take an interest in Mr. Smith’s cigar machine.”
16  
Molleson had previously advanced Smith money to help him develop a patent letter box.  
How the initial contact was made is unclear, but this previous association encouraged 
Smith to entrust the marketing of his cigar patent to Molleson.  It may be that similar 
connections account for other cases where businessmen handled the sale of patents 
unconnected to their main areas of expertise. For example, intermediaries whose 
businesses were as diverse as textile manufacturing and engineering consulting submitted 
telephone inventions for sale to AT&T on behalf of inventors.
17   
More commonly, however, inventors turned for marketing assistance to the local 
attorneys and agents who processed their patent applications. After the 1836 law 
increased the security of patent rights and both patenting activity and trade in patented 
inventions took off, the numbers of these practitioners began to grow—first in the 
vicinity of Washington, DC (where, of course, the Patent Office was located) and then in 
other urban centers, especially in the Northeast (where the overwhelming majority of 
                                                           
16 “Testimony Taken on Behalf of James Edward Smith,” Hammerstein v. Smith (1890), pp. 62-8, 
Case 13,618, Box 1868, Interference Case Files, 1836-1905, Records of the Patent Office, Record Group 
241, National Archives.   14
patented inventions were generated).  By the early 1880s there were about 550 such 
agents registered to practice before the Patent Office.  Slightly more than half of these 
were located in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, a quarter in the District of 
Columbia, another fifth in the Midwest, and the rest were scattered through a few 
southern and western locations.
18 
The ostensible function of these specialists was to shepherd inventions through 
the Patent Office’s application process and, in the case of lawyers, to defend their clients’ 
patents in interference and infringement proceedings.  In the regular course of their 
business, however, patent agents and lawyers obtained a great deal of information about 
participants on both sides of the market for technology.  They were used, for example, by 
buyers of new technology to evaluate the merits of inventions in advance of purchase, 
and, in this manner, gained knowledge about the kinds of patents buyers were interested 
in purchasing, as well as personal insight into the character of the people involved.  
Inventors, of course, used them to file patent applications, in the process providing them 
with advance information about technologies soon to come on the market.  Moreover, 
inventors frequently developed close relationships with their patent agents that 
encouraged them to try out new ideas on these specialists.  For example, when Joseph 
Arbes, a fur manufacturer in New York City who also invented sewing machines, came 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 T. D. Lockwood, Reports of Inventions (Not Approved), 1904-8, Box 1383, AT&T Corporate 
Archives. 
18 U.S. Patent Office, Roster of Registered Attorneys Entitled to Practice before the United States 
Patent Office (1883). The practice of inventors extracting income from their inventions by selling off or 
licensing the rights to their patents began early.  Among a sample of “great inventors” active during the 
first half of the nineteenth century, roughly two-thirds derived some income from either the sale of 
licensing of their patent rights.  It is also relevant to note that these great inventors were disproportionately 
located in those areas where patent agents and lawyers were concentrated.  See B. Zorina Khan and 
Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “‘Schemes of Practical Utility’: Entrepreneurship and Innovation Among ‘Great 
Inventors’ in the United States, 1790-1865,” Journal of Economic History, 53 (June 1993), pp. 289-307.  
Around the turn of twentieth century, Cresee estimated that only about one-fifth of inventors wanted to   15
up with an idea for a blind stitching machine that would use a flat-sided needle, he 
immediately dispatched a sketch of the needle to his attorney, William E. Knight, for a 
judgment as to its potential patentability.   He had not even experimented with the needle 
on a sewing machine at that point, and both the casualness with which he made the 
request and the primitive state of his invention at that time suggest that he had an ongoing 
relationship with his attorney, who acted in part as a sounding board for his ideas.
19 
Patent agents and solicitors were advantageously placed to function as 
intermediaries in another way as well: they often had links with colleagues in different 
cities who could be sources of information about new inventions originating elsewhere 
and about potential buyers for patents developed locally. Some of these links were 
formal.  For example, Boston patent lawyer Frederick Fish took on a partner, Charles 
Neave, in 1893.  Two years later Fish sent Neave to New York City to open a branch 
office.
20  Similarly, after Samuel S. Fisher, U.S. Commissioner of Patents during the 
Grant administration, returned to private practice in Cincinnati, he took in Samuel A. 
Duncan as a partner and almost immediately packed him off to New York to open an 
office for the firm there.
21  Other links derived from familial connections.  For example, 
the Boston firm of Wright, Brown, Quinby & May had ties with a Chicago firm 
established by the brother of one of the partners.  Still other links were built up through 
letters of introduction and repeat business.  Thus Wright, Brown, Quinby & May 
                                                                                                                                                                             
manufacture their devices themselves whereas about four-fifths wanted to sell off the rights to others.  See 
Practical Pointer for Patentees, p. 15. 
19 Knight apparently thought that the invention was not promising, so Arbes experimented with it 
for a few months before approaching Knight again.  See “Testimony on Behalf of Joseph Arbes,” pp. 10, 
22-3, 26, Arbes v. Lewis (1900), Case 20,049, Box 2,715, Interference Case Files, 1836-1905.  
20 John E. Nathan, Fish & Neave:  Leaders in the Law of Ideas (New York:  Newcomen Society, 
1997), pp. 13, 19.   16
funneled their Philadelphia business through a firm with which the partners had no 
apparent personal connection but with which they had long done business.  Virtually all 
patent agents, moreover, had regular dealings with at least one attorney in Washington, 
who assumed responsibility for conducting searches of patent records and also 
represented them in preliminary interviews with examiners in the Patent Office.
22  That 
these links to agents in other parts of the country could be used to market patents is 
suggested by a letter from one intermediary to “friend Jenks” (Lemuel Jenks, a patent 
lawyer), asking for Jenks’s assistance in marketing the device:  “We have offered said 
Patent so far to the B & O and N C R R Comps. . . . We intend to sell it to one person for 
the six New England States and I therefore wish you would give me your opinion in that 
matter: to viz what price you think we should ask; what would we have to pay you for 
your assistence [sic] in carrying and effecting a sale.”
23  
Just as advice manuals cautioned inventors not to trust intermediaries who 
advertised in trade publications, there were warnings to be wary of unscrupulous patent 
agents and attorneys.  Indeed, some practitioners themselves took the extreme position 
that it was improper for members of their profession to function as intermediaries.  Thus 
H. W. Boardman & Company announced in a pamphlet promoting the firm’s services 
that it was “a rule rigidly adhered to in this establishment, never to take contingent 
interests in applications for Patents, nor to negotiate sales of Patent rights, or become the 
owners in whole or in part of them.” As the pamphlet explained, such activity potentially 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 In Memoriam:  Samuel S. Fisher (Cincinnati:  Robert Clarke & Co., 1874), pp. 23-4.  It was 
common for individuals who worked in the patent office, even as simple examiners, to move on to become 
private patent agents later in their career.  
22 For insight into such correspondent relations, see Wright, Brown, Quinby & May 
Correspondence Files, Waltham Watch Company, 1854-1929, Mss. 598, Case 2, Baker Library, Harvard 
Graduate School of Business Administration.   17
put the interests of the patentee in conflict with those of his attorney: “If an attorney 
become a dabbler in Patents (as many do), how is it possible for an Investor to be assured 
that he is not disclosing his secret to the very party who will be the most interested in 
defeating his application?”
24 
Certainly, when patent solicitors functioned as intermediaries, all kinds of 
conflicts of interest were possible. Although some patentees may have hesitated to reveal 
information about their inventions to agents who “dabbled” in patents in this way, the 
more likely problem was that agents interested in seeing transactions concluded may have 
put their own interests before those of either the patentee or the assignee. In this respect 
the market for technology can be thought of as much like the real estate market, where 
agents’ primary goal is a sale, and where buyers and sellers alike face a great deal of 
uncertainty about whose interest the agent is truly representing. Although these kinds of 
conflicts of interest have been mitigated in the case of real estate by a combination of 
regulation and self-policing, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the 
market for technology was largely unregulated and professional organizations like the bar 
association were extremely weak. In such a context, one would expect to see reputational 
mechanisms playing an increasingly important role and to observe that successful patent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23Letter of 30 April 1870 from Aug. H. Fick [last name not completely legible] to Jenks, Box 3, 
Folder 59, MSS 867, Lemuel Jenks, 1844-1879, Baker Library. 
24 H. W. Boardman & Co., Solicitors of American & European Patents for Inventions, Hints to 
Inventors and Others Interested in Patent Matters (Boston:  privately printed, 1869), p. 13. Practitioners in 
this wing of the profession also warned inventors that if they entrusted their inventions to agents who were 
primarily intermediaries rather than legal specialists, they risked obtaining patents that would not withstand 
scrutiny by the courts. “The result is, that out of the numerous patents which have been litigated since the 
foundation of our Patent System, not one in ten has been sustained by the courts without being reissued to 
cure defects.” See the brochure of A. H. Evans & Co., Solicitors of American and Foreign Patents (Rev. 
ed.; Washington, DC:  privately printed, n. d.), p. 1.   18
agents and lawyers were those who made substantial investments in cultivating 
reputations for fair, as well as insightful, dealing.
25   
As we will show in the next two sections of this article, there is evidence that 
successful intermediaries did indeed make such investments and that, as a result, they 
were able to improve the efficiency of the market for patented technology.  Before 
proceeding to this analysis, however, it is important to note that the willingness of patent 
agents and lawyers to function as intermediaries sometimes made it possible for inventors 
without funds to gain access to patent protection in the first place.  Although the cost of 
filing a patent application in the United States was modest by British standards, the $35 
filing fee was still a substantial barrier for many wage earners.  Moreover, even in routine 
cases, the additional charges associated with securing drawings, models, searches of 
patent office records, and legal assistance might add another $50 to $100 to total costs.  
Patent agents and lawyers who functioned as intermediaries might reduce or even waive 
many of these charges in the case of patents they thought were valuable, or they might 
find purchasers for the inventions who would bear the costs of applying for the patents.  
For example, Lansing Onderdonk, an inventor of sewing machines, testified that he did 
not have the funds to patent his lock-stitch invention.  When he secured employment with 
the Union Special Sewing Machine Company, he tried to interest his new employers in 
the invention without success (the firm specialized in a different type of stitch).  He was 
only able finally to patent the invention when lawyer Charles L. Sturtevant took an 
                                                           
25 For a more formal analysis of an analogous case, see Asher Wolinsky, “Competition in a Market 
for Informed Experts’ Services,” Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (Autumn 1993), pp. 380-98.   19
interest in the invention and “said he would take the case and that I could pay him as I 
could.”
26 
Quantitative Evidence on the Role of Intermediaries 
It seems likely that, when patent agents and lawyers functioned as intermediaries 
in the market for technology, they improved the efficiency with which patents were 
traded.  The sheer number of patents offered for sale by the late nineteenth century 
suggests that the knowledge these specialists were well positioned to acquire, both about 
inventions still on the drawing boards and also about the needs of potential purchasers of 
new technologies, would have helped them match sellers with appropriate buyers in an 
expeditious way.
27  It also seems likely that such intermediation would have had positive 
effects on the pace of technological change in general.  By facilitating a division of labor 
that enabled inventors to spin off the distracting and time-consuming work of 
commercialization to others, intermediaries should have made it possible for creative 
                                                           
26 See “Deposition of witnesses examined on behalf of Lansing Onderdonk,” pp. 36-8, 47-8, 
Onderdonk v. Mack (1897), Case 18,194, Box 2,521, Interference Case Files, 1836-1905. The interference 
records are filled with statements by patentees that lack of funds had prevented them from patenting 
inventions or from filing applications in a timely fashion.   
27 Moreover, the personal knowledge that they were also able to acquire about parties on both 
sides of the market helped them solve information problems that were unique to these kinds of transactions. 
To give one example, suppose that a firm bought a patent from an independent inventor and the patent was 
subsequently challenged in an infringement or interference proceeding. Although an assignee could seek 
redress against an assignor who conveyed a patent later declared invalid, there were many instances in 
which the assignee’s position vis à vis competitors depended on the successful defense of the patent—
which in turn often depended on the cooperation of the patentee.  For example, in an interference case (a 
proceeding set in motion when two inventors applied for or received patents for the same device), the 
outcome usually hinged on the inventors’ relative ability to demonstrate priority by documenting the dates 
on which they conceived of the invention and reduced it to practice.  Hence when a firm bought an 
invention, it needed to know more than technical details. It needed personal knowledge of the patentee—
the assurance that, if necessary, the patentee would assist in a patent office or court proceeding and, further, 
that the patentee would be an articulate witness who would be able to document the priority and substance 
of his claim.   20
people to focus their attention more exclusively on coming up with new technological 
ideas.  
In this section, we explore these possibilities systematically, using the rich trove 
of data that the Patent Office has left to historians.  These sources include published lists 
of patent grants that contain the names and places of residence of the patentees and of any 
assignees to whom the patentees transferred rights in advance of issue.
28  More important 
for the purposes of this paper are the manuscript copies of contracts for the assignment of 
patent rights now stored in the National Archives. In order to be legally valid, a complete 
copy of any contract selling or transferring the right to a patent had to be deposited with 
the Patent Office within three months.  Patent Office clerks maintained a chronological 
registry of these documents and, in addition, summarized their basic details into a 
separate digest that was organized chronologically but also divided into volumes 
according to the first letter of the patentee’s surname.
29 
Our first step was to document the changes that occurred over the course of the 
nineteenth century in the way that rights to patents were most commonly sold. Although 
intermediaries potentially increased the efficiency with which patents could be marketed, 
their role was shaped in turn by the kinds of rights that purchasers most wanted to buy 
and patentees to sell.  Inspection of the Patent Office’s assignment records for the 1840s 
and 1850s —that is, for the period when the sale of patent rights first exploded after 
passage of the 1836 patent law—reveals that most of the contracts entailed 
geographically specific assignments to producers in different parts of the country. Such 
assignments, which constituted the vast majority of the total until well into the 1850s and 
                                                           
28 See the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents, published by the Government Printing 
Office in Washington.   21
as much as 90 percent during the 1840s, made a great deal of sense in a context where 
high transportation costs led to geographically segmented markets protected against 
competition from other regions. Even inventors engaged in exploiting their ideas 
themselves could increase their returns by selling geographically limited rights to their 
inventions in other parts of the country.
30 Once, however, the expansion of railroads and 
other improvements in transportation and distribution made it possible for manufacturers 
in a single location to market their products nationally, producers increasingly wanted to 
purchase full national rights to technologies important in their businesses.  Not 
surprisingly, the proportion of assignments that involved geographically limited rights 
began to rapidly decline.  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all of the 
approximately 4,600 contracts filed with the Patent Office during the months of January 
1871, January 1891, and January 1911. Already by 1871 geographic assignments 
accounted for less than a quarter of the total for the nation as a whole, though they 
retained greater importance in the Middle West, particularly in the West North Central 
states.  By 1911, they had almost completely disappeared in all regions of the country.
31 
 [Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 also provides suggestive indications that the efficiency of the market for 
technology was increasing at the same time as the nature of the rights being sold was 
changing.  In the first place, there was a drop in the proportion of secondary assignments 
                                                                                                                                                                             
29 [need information on the Record Group, etc. here] 
30 For an excellent example, see Carolyn Cooper’s account of the assiduousness with which 
Thomas Blanchard, inventor of the gunstocking lathe and other wood-shaping inventions, assigned 
geographically limited patent rights to producers in distant areas.  See Shaping Invention:  Thomas 
Blanchard’s Machinery and Patent Management in Nineteenth-Century America (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1991). 
31 Because of this shift away from multiple geographic assignments, the reported ratio of 
assignments in our sample to the total number of patents should not be interpreted as a measure of the   22
(sales of patents where the assignor was neither the patentee nor a relative of the 
patentee). That there was less reselling of patents as time went on may be an indication 
that the market was doing a better job of matching patentees who wanted to sell patents 
with buyers who were well placed to exploit them. In any event, an increasingly large 
proportion of sales were being made directly by patentees to assignees who would hold 
on to the property rights for the duration of the grants.
32 Second, the table records a 
dramatic fall in the proportion of assignments that occurred after the date the patent was 
issued—from 72.3 percent of the total in 1870-71 to 36.5 percent in 1910-11.  That 
patentees were able to sell their inventions earlier and earlier—increasingly before their 
patents were actually issued—may also be an important indication that the efficiency of 
trade in patents was improving.
33 
Whether these changes signaled real advances in the operation of the market for 
technology and, if so, whether intermediaries were responsible for a significant 
proportion of the gains are issues that remain to be explored.  We tackle these questions 
by exploiting an intriguing feature of the Patent Office’s digests of assignment 
contracts—their inclusion of the names and addresses of the persons to whom all 
correspondence concerning assignments was to be addressed.  Although some of these 
correspondents may simply have handled the paperwork associated with drawing up and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
proportion of patents that were ever assigned.  Nor should trends in this ratio be taken to indicate trends in 
the proportion of patents assigned. 
32 The assignor might, however, license the right to use the invention to others.  Although 
assignment contracts had to be filed with the Patent Office in order to be legally binding, there was no 
similar legal requirement to file licensing agreements.  Our sample of assignment contracts does contain 
some licensing agreements, but they are very few in number, and anecdotal evidence suggests that those 
recorded in this manner were a declining proportion of the total of such agreements over time.  
33At least part of the rise in the fraction of assignments that occurred before issue resulted from an 
increase in the length of time consumed by the application process.  In order to get a rough idea of the 
extent of the increase, we compared two samples of 125 patents each drawn from the October 1874 and 
October 1911 issues of the Official Gazette of the United States Patent Office.  In 1874 the median time   23
recording contracts for the sale of patent rights, others likely functioned as deal makers.  
We investigate this possibility by testing whether change in the identity of these 
correspondents was systematically related to other developments in the market for 
technology—for example, increases in the speed with which patent rights were sold. 
Examination of the digests of the assignment contracts for the 1840s and 1850s, 
when the great majority of assignments entailed geographically limited rights, suggests 
that there was wide variety in the identity of the correspondents.   Many, of course, were 
principals in the transactions.  Some of these were assignors who previously had received 
shares of the patents and who may have been taken on as partners with responsibility for 
marketing the rights.  Many others were located near assignees who purchased rights 
limited to the geographic areas in which they resided.  These correspondents may simply 
have been local attorneys with diverse practices.  Assignees may have learned about the 
patents through other channels and have come to them to process the paperwork.
34  
Over time, however, the identity of the correspondents changed in important 
ways. As already mentioned, for a brief period around the Civil War, a substantial 
fraction of assignments was handled by the large patent agencies (such as Munn & 
Company) that published respected periodicals on technological developments.  By the 
1870s, however, the market share of these firms had begun to decline as patentees 
increasingly turned to specialized patent agents and lawyers to handle their assignments.  
In order to gauge the role that this new category of correspondents played in the market 
for technology, we collected information from the assignment digests on all of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
between application and issue was 4 months and the mean 5.8 months.  In 1911 the median was 12 months 
and the mean 18.2 months. 
34 This interpretation is supported by the observation that it was not uncommon for multiple 
geographically limited assignments of the same patent to be handled by different correspondents. That   24
contracts filed with the Patent Office during the first three months of 1871, 1891, and 1911 
for patents whose inventors had surnames beginning with the letter “B.”
35  We then 
classified each assignment contract (and the patents it included) by the identity of the 
correspondent. Working with lists of patent agents and lawyers from 1883 and 1905, we 
distinguished correspondents who were formally registered with the Patent Office in at 
least one of these two years as a separate class of intermediaries.  Correspondents who were 
principals to the contract (either the patentee, the assignor, or the assignee of one of the 
patents involved) were grouped together in a second category of intermediaries. A third 
category consisted of third parties who did not appear on either of the two lists of registered 
agents.  It seems likely, however, that we would have been able to identify some of these 
correspondents as registered agents if we had rosters for additional years.  Finally, we 
include in an “unknown” category cases where no correspondent was reported in the digest. 
Because some of these contracts in the sample covered more than one patent, we present 
the data with the unit of analysis defined in two different ways:  the individual patent 
assigned and the complete assignment contract (with the descriptive statistics calculated on 
the basis of the first patent described in the contract). 
[Table 2 about here] 
In Table 2 we report descriptive statistics (across both patents and contracts) for 
each of the correspondent classes for 1871, 1891, and 1911.  As is immediately evident, the 
relative prominence of registered patent agents in this trade increased over time.  
Registered agents served as correspondents for 26.1 (29.7) percent of the patents (contracts) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
some of the correspondents during this period were merely processing paperwork is also implied by the 
identification of quite a few of them as congressmen.   25
assigned in 1871, with their shares increasing to 42.7 (51.8) percent in 1891, and 55.7 
(58.1) percent in 1911.  The rise in importance of these registered agents was paralleled by 
a decline in the proportion of patent assignments handled by one of the principals 
(patentees, assignors, or assignees)—from 33.0 (33.9) percent of patents (contracts) in 1871 
to 11.2 (9.5) percent in 1911.   There was also a drop in the fraction handled by third 
parties, indicating that not only was there a shift over time toward the use of intermediaries, 
but there was a shift toward more specialized ones as well.  That registered agents were 
indeed relatively more specialized in this activity is indicated by the higher average 
numbers of contracts they handled, compared to correspondents in the other categories.  
For example, in 1871 the average registered agent served as correspondent for 2.36 
contracts, whereas the averages for principals and unregistered third parties were 1.05 and 
1.26 respectively. These figures, moreover, undoubtedly underestimate the total number of 
contracts handled by specialized intermediaries, as they are based on only a small subset of 
all assignment contracts (3 months of assignments for patents whose patentees had 
surnames beginning with the letter “B”). 
The use of specialized intermediaries seems to have been particularly important for 
the types of assignments that, as we saw from Table 1, were growing in relative importance 
by the end of the century—that is, primary assignments that were geographically 
unrestricted.  Although all types of correspondents handled roughly similar proportions of 
secondary assignments in 1871, by 1911 only 9 percent of the contracts mediated by 
registered agents (15 percent of patents) involved secondary assignments, as opposed to 24 
(28) percent for principals and 21 (31) percent for unregistered third parties.  As early as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35 We chose “B” because more surnames began with this letter than with any other. The sample 
included 286 contracts (involving 437 patents) from 1871, 423 contracts (858 patents) from 1891, and 614   26
1871, moreover, assignments handled by intermediaries (especially registered agents) were 
much more likely to be national in scope than those handled by principals.  Fully 89 
percent of the contracts for which the correspondent was a registered patent agent were 
national, as opposed to 70 percent for unregistered third parties and 51 percent for 
principals.  Despite the general shift toward national assignments, the differences were still 
evident in 1911, when 97 percent of the contracts mediated by specialized agents were for 
national assignments but only 69 percent of the contracts handled by principals. 
Although skeptics might object that the increased use of patent agents might simply 
reflect a growing tendency for employees to transfer patent rights to their employers, rather 
than a true professionalization of intermediation in arms-length trading of technology, the 
evidence in the table suggests otherwise.  The reported percentages of patent assignments 
going to companies (as opposed to individuals), show that the trend over time toward 
assigning patents to companies accounts for very little of the change in the composition of 
correspondents. If we look at patents, for example, the proportion of the assignments 
handled by registered agents that went to companies (28, 39, and 61 percent in 1871, 1891, 
and 1911 respectively) was in general only slightly greater than the fraction in the category 
handled by principals (24, 28, and 55 percent in the respective years) and that handled by 
unregistered third parties (20, 48, and 46 percent).  It seems, therefore, that the growth of 
trade in patented technologies over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was 
indeed accompanied by the emergence and increased importance of agents who were 
specialized at working in that market. 
If patent agents offered efficiency advantages in trading patents, we would expect 
to find that patentees who employed them were able to dispose of their rights more quickly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
contracts (880 patents) from 1911.   27
than those who used less specialized intermediaries and than those who handled the sale of 
their patents themselves.  Table 2 shows that this expectation is borne out by the data.  In 
1871, for example, 47 percent of the patent assignments (61 percent of the assignment 
contracts) handled by registered patent agents occurred before issue, as opposed to only 18 
(23 percent) for those handled by unregistered third parties and 9 (8) percent of those 
handled by principals.  At this time, the average interval between application for and grant 
of a patent was very short—less than half a year.  The high proportion of assignments 
handled by registered agents that nonetheless occurred before issue suggests that these 
specialists were indeed performing an important matching function—that, perhaps by 
cultivating long-term relationships with inventors, they were able to obtain advance 
information about new technologies coming on the market, and that they also had a 
sufficient range of contacts within the business community to enable them sell patents very 
quickly. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 provides additional evidence that the use of registered agents enabled 
inventors to dispose of their property rights more quickly than they could on their own.  
The table reports for different classes of correspondents the distributions of both primary 
and secondary assignments, broken down by the speed of assignment (measured relative to 
the date the patent in question was granted by the Patent Office).  Once again, assignments 
handled by registered agents were much more likely to occur before the patent was actually 
issued than those handled by others. Conversely, registered agents were less likely to 
handle assignments that occurred more than five-years after issue.  These patterns, 
moreover, held in general for secondary as well as for primary assignments.     28
We can get a better sense of the importance of the role played by these specialized 
intermediaries by comparing the characteristics of patentees whose assignments were 
handled by registered agents to patentees who either negotiated their assignments 
themselves or relied on other principals (assignors or assignees) to do so.  If intermediaries 
did indeed offer some advantage in trading patent rights, such as lower transactions costs, 
one would expect that the inventors who sought out relationships with them would be those 
who were both more specialized at inventive activity and more inclined to extract the 
returns to their efforts by selling off the rights to their inventions. In order to test this 
proposition, we retrieved, for each of the assigned patents in our sample, a five-year history 
of all patents received and assigned at issue by the respective patentees, using the year the 
assigned patent was granted as the mid-year (thus, we looked two years back and two years 
forward from the base year).  The results, which are reported in Table 2, indicate that the 
predicted pattern did develop over time.   
In 1871 the average five-year total of patents awarded to patentees whose contracts 
were handled by registered agents was roughly similar to the numbers for patentees whose 
assignments were handled by the other categories of correspondents (although patentees 
whose contracts were handled by registered agents were somewhat more likely to assign 
their patents at issue).  By 1891, however, a clear difference had emerged between 
patentees whose assignments were mediated by third parties and those who used principals 
as correspondents—both in terms of the average number of patents obtained over the five-
year period and the proportion of those patents assigned at issue.  As time went on, 
moreover, the use of the two types of intermediaries grew even more differentiated, such 
that by 1911 the tendency for patentees who were both most productive and most involved   29
in the market to turn to registered agents to handle their contracts was even more 
pronounced.   In that year, patentees who used registered agents averaged five-year totals of 
6.92 patents weighting over patents (4.99 over contracts), compared to 3.76 (4.04) patents 
for those who used unregistered third parties and 2.28 (2.45) patents for those who used 
principals.  Patentees who used registered agents also, on average, assigned markedly 
higher proportions of their patents at issue:  5.97 (4.21) of the patents they received during 
the five-year period, as opposed to 2.66 (3.11) for those who used unregistered third parties 
and 0.69 (0.84) for those who relied on principals. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The increased association between specialized inventors and specialized 
intermediaries is explored in another way in Table 4.  Here the total number of contracts 
(appearing in our sample) that were handled by each correspondent is employed as an 
indicator, albeit perhaps a weak one, of his degree of specialization in this function.  
Although the choices of productive (or specialized) inventors appear to have been little 
different from those of other patentees in 1871, over time a stronger relationship between 
specialized inventors and specialized intermediaries emerged.  For example, in 1911, 67 
percent of the contracts involving the least productive patentees (those with only one patent 
over five years) were handled by correspondents with only one contract, and a mere 4 
percent by correspondents with six or more contracts to their credit.  By contrast, patentees 
with four or more patents over the five-year period were relatively more likely to have 
turned to correspondents with six or more contracts in our sample (who handled 16 percent 
of their contracts), and relatively less likely to use correspondents with only one (who 
handled 35 percent of their contracts).  Although not strong evidence, this pattern is   30
remarkably striking, given that our measure of a correspondent’s degree of specialization 
includes only three months of assignments for patentees with surnames beginning with the 
letter “B” and, therefore provides only a crude means of distinguishing between specialized 
and unspecialized correspondents. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The tendency for patentees with the greatest market involvement to turn to 
professional intermediaries is also evident in Table 5, which shows that as early as 1871, 80 
percent of the patentees who assigned at issue more than 60 percent of their five-year total 
of patents (not including the patent involved in the assignment originally sampled from the 
Digest) made use of an intermediary (that is, a correspondent that was not a principal to the 
contract) for the recorded transaction, and that fully 50 percent employed a registered 
agent.  Over time, moreover, the table reveals a general shift both toward higher rates of 
assignment and toward the use of registered agents.  Indeed, by 1911 the modal cell in the 
entire distribution was patentees who assigned more than 60 percent of their five-year total 
of patents and who also used a registered agent.  Two-thirds of the patentees who assigned 
more than 60 percent of their patents employed registered agents for the transaction 
sampled. These results provide intriguing support for the idea that because registered 
agents were more efficient at intermediation in the market for technology than other types 
of correspondents, inventors who wanted to make extensive use of the market sought them 
out. 
The literature on financial markets, to which we alluded in our introduction, makes 
the case that intermediaries not only improved the efficiency with which funds were 
transferred from savers to investors, but also raised the level of savings in the economy.    31
One might expect that the appearance of intermediaries between buyers and sellers of 
patented technology might have had a similar effect on the pace of technological change by 
encouraging creative people to specialize in invention.  Unfortunately, we cannot test this 
proposition directly, but the evidence that we can present is highly suggestive.  For 
example, the effect of the growth of the market for patented technology on the assignment 
behavior of inventors can be traced in Table 6, which reports descriptive statistics for three 
random cross-sectional samples of patents drawn from the Annual Reports of the 
Commissioner of Patents for the years 1870-71, 1890-91, and 1910-11.  It is important to 
note that the table only includes assignments that were arranged in advance of the grant of 
the patent.  Nonetheless, we can see from the table that there was a sharp increase over time 
in the proportion of patents thus assigned—from 18.4 to 31.1 percent.  There was also a 
pronounced shift toward assignments in which patentees transferred all rights to their 
intellectual property to buyers with whom they had no formal connection.  In 1870-71, for 
example, more than half of the assignments (52.1 percent) went to groups that included the 
patentee.  By 1910-11 this proportion had fallen to 25.4 percent.  At the same time, the 
share of assignments going to companies increased sharply from 23.6 percent in 1870-71 to 
64.2 percent in 1910-11.  Although some of these transfers involved companies in which 
the patentee had an ownership interest (for example, the proportion made to companies 
bearing the patentee’s name increased from 5.6 percent in 1870-71 to 9.2 percent in 1910-
11), the vast majority were arms-length sales.  As we have shown in other work, 
assignments by employees to the firms that employed them were not a major determinant 
of the increased frequency of assignments at issue or the trend toward assignments to 
companies.
36 
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[Table 6 about here] 
That this increased ability to sell off patent rights did indeed make it possible for 
creative individuals to specialize in inventive activity is supported by the evidence in Table 
7, which we constructed first by selecting from our three random cross-sectional samples 
patentees whose surnames began with the letter “B” and then by collecting data on all the 
patents awarded to these individuals over the twenty-five years before and after they 
appeared in one of our samples. We analyze the patenting and assignment behavior of these 
individuals in two ways:  by including in our calculations each patent they obtained and by 
selecting for analysis only one patent per patentee (the patent included in the original cross-
sectional sample).  The table reports descriptive statistics for four categories of patentees:  
those who did not assign their patent before issue; those who assigned the patent but also 
maintained an ownership interest in it; those who assigned away all of their rights to the 
patent to an individual; and those who assigned full rights to a company. 
[Table 7 about here] 
As Table 7 shows, in each of the three time periods patentees who assigned all their 
rights to companies by the time of issue had very different careers of inventive activity than 
other groups of patentees.  They received many more patents over time, were active at 
inventive activity for a longer period, and assigned away a much higher proportion of the 
patents they were awarded.  The contrasts are evident as early as the 1870-71 cohort, but 
they are much starker by 1910-11.  For example, the means computed over patentees 
(patents) drawn in the 1910-11 cross-section indicate that those who assigned their patents 
at issue to companies received 32.6 (135.6) patents over their careers on average, whereas 
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Markets, and Countries, Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds. (Chicago:    33
those who did not assign, those who made only partial assignments, and those who made 
full assignments to individuals were granted 6.4 (38.2), 2.6 (24.4), and 3.0 (39.2). 
In general, Table 7 highlights the emergence over time of two rather sharply 
differentiated classes of inventors.  The first was composed primarily of individuals who 
tended to retain control of the relatively few patents they received over rather short careers 
at invention.  These occasional inventors had little involvement with the market for 
technology.  The other class of inventors, by contrast, had careers that were largely shaped 
by the market.  They assigned away a high proportion of their inventions (especially to 
companies) and were quite focused on generating patented inventions, receiving many 
patents over careers that extended over several decades.  Most prolific patentees fell into 
this second category, and it would seem reasonable to conclude on the basis of the evidence 
we have collected that the market for technology played a central role in enabling them to 
specialize in this creative activity. 
The Case of Edward Van Winkle 
The quantitative evidence thus supports the contention that the use of specialized 
intermediaries like patent agents and lawyers improved the efficiency of the market for 
patented technology.  Ideally we would like to collect data on the activities of a broad 
sample of these specialists so that we can document the ways in which they facilitated the 
sale of patent rights, but most patent agents and lawyers have left only fragmentary traces 
in the historical record.  The fortuitous preservation of one set of business diaries, 
however, has enabled us to track the activities of one such solicitor, Edward Van Winkle, 
in unusually close detail. Van Winkle resided in Jersey City, New Jersey, but worked in 
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New York City.  In January 1905, he moved into a new office in the Flatiron Building in 
lower Manhattan, and for the rest of that year we are able to analyze the relationships he 
cultivated with men on both sides of the market for technology and to observe the various 
ways in which he performed the function of intermediary.
37 
Like many patent agents of the time, Van Winkle’s formal training was in 
engineering rather than law.  He was a graduate of Columbia University, and his diary 
records the pride with which he displayed his certificate of membership in the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, as well as the eagerness with which he sought positions 
in other engineering societies.
38  By contrast, Van Winkle’s legal education was quite 
casual.  In 1905, he enrolled in Sprague’s Correspondence School, signed up for courses 
in contracts, agency, partnerships, corporations, and real property, studied the assigned 
texts during his spare time, took written examinations in these subjects, and received a 
Certificate of Law—all in the space of five months.
39  
As befitted his training, Van Winkle earned part of his living as an engineering 
consultant.  For example, in 1905 he was employed by various parties to determine the 
horsepower needed for a hydraulic pump, design the hub of an automobile wheel, and 
calculate specifications for a twelve-story apartment house project.
40 By contrast, he did 
no legal work outside the area of patents and, indeed, hired other lawyers to represent his 
interests in lawsuits or to process incorporation papers.
41  Even in the area of patents, his 
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legal knowledge seems to have been limited.  For example, he asked around and got the 
name of someone “who is very capable in foreign patent application work” and thereafter 
subcontracted much of this kind of business to him.
42  He also did relatively little of the 
more complex side of patent law, such as defending inventors’ rights in infringement 
proceedings. Like other patent lawyers, however, he had long-standing relationships with 
solicitors in other parts of the country.  For example, he routinely used the Washington 
firm of Evans & Company to conduct searches of patent office records and preliminary 
interviews with patent examiners.
43 As we will see, he also had extensive dealings with 
an agent in another city named Zappert.
44 
Van Winkle’s engineering expertise enabled him to provide technical assistance 
to businessmen interested in purchasing patents.  For example, Frank P. Parker and 
Frederick J. Bosse brought him a “non-refillable bottle” and several other devices 
invented by John L. Adams, and requested that he test the inventions and assess their 
patentability.  When Van Winkle reported positively, the men engaged him to process 
Adams’s patent applications and also papers assigning the patents to themselves.
45  
Parker and Bosse seem to have invested in these patents with the aim of reselling them, 
for Van Winkle’s diary includes a couple of entries noting visits by potential purchasers, 
including one businessman who indicated that, though his company did not want to take 
up the invention, he himself “would be interested to look at it.”
46  It is unclear, however, 
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whether Van Winkle had lined up these potential customers—that is, whether he was 
functioning as an intermediary in these instances—or whether he was simply providing 
information to prospective buyers contacted by Parker and Bosse. 
On other occasions, however, Van Winkle clearly played the role of 
intermediary—sometimes on behalf of inventors and sometimes on behalf of purchasers 
of patents. He noted in his diary, for example, that inventor S. A. Davis “placed in my 
hands a matter of adjusting royalties + disposing of his drophead patent and said he 
would give me half of what I collected.”
47 A businessman named Kendall dropped by 
Van Winkle’s office to discuss letting him “have the foreign patents in melting furnaces.” 
Later Kendall called again, and “we started the ball a rolling for sale of foreign pats of the 
Rockwell furnace.”  Among the first steps Van Winkle took in marketing these patents 
was to forward information about them to Zappert, an agent in another city with whom he 
had ongoing contact.
48 Van Winkle also worked from time to time as an intermediary on 
behalf of parties in other cities.  For example, after Zappert wrote and sent him 
“specimens + literature” about a dry adhesive photographic mounting process, he “took it 
around to Chas Walsh + he thought it would be a valuable thing to control, he is going to 
get ideas on the matter and see what he can do towards making some money out of the 
scheeme [sic].”
49  
In some cases Van Winkle himself took a position in a patent as part of the deal.  
Thus an inventor named Pratt “agreed to let me have that patent [for a differential valve 
motion] on a shop right royalty of 10¢ and all over that sum I would have if I sold.”
50  
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Indeed, there is evidence that Van Winkle actively sought such participations.  For 
example, he told one of the officers of the Davis, Redpath Company, that “I would sell 
him the Canadian patent for 5000
xx + if he would assine [sic] me” and do certain other 
things not specified in the diary entry, “[I] would be willing to go in with him.”
51 On still 
other occasions, he displayed an interest in investing in a new technology long before it 
got to the patent stage.  After “Sol Katz called with a kite proposition,” he began to study 
kites and flying machines and visit the shops of people who were experimenting with the 
devices.  A month late he and Katz agreed jointly to put up money for the development of 
a promising invention.
52  
As one might expect, Van Winkle’s work as intermediary sometimes put him in 
situations where there was a clear conflict of interest.  For example, W. N. Richardson, 
one of the businessmen with whom he regularly dealt, wanted an option to buy out 
inventor Edward A. Howe’s interest in some patents.  Van Winkle recorded Richardson’s 
offer as follows:  “He will give $3000 to 4000 for the last two patents and give me a 
commission of 10%.  If I can get the patents for less, will receive a larger fee.”
53 Van 
Winkle called on Howe and “had a hard fight to get Howe to accept terms.”  Ultimately, 
however, after a session that lasted two and a half hours, Howe agreed to accept 
Richardson’s terms “provided R will give him a free hand in all future patents.”
54  
Somehow, throughout all of these negotiations, Van Winkle managed to be completely 
above board with the inventor about his interest in the deal.  He maintained excellent 
relations with Howe, who continued to do business with him for the rest of the period of 
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the diary.  Indeed, after Richardson later decided not to take up the patents, Howe 
confided to Van Winkle that he had “only signed option so that I [Van Winkle] could 
collect my fee.” Although this statement should probably not be taken at face value, it is 
an indication of the strength of the relationship that Van Winkle had been able to build 
with this inventor.  
That Van Winkle was able to cultivate relations of trust with a number of 
inventors is evinced by their willingness to come back to him again with new ideas.  For 
example, the Adams who invented the non-refillable bottle subsequently approached him 
seeking “money on a tooth pick scheme.  Saturated wooden toothpicks with spice flavors 
that are antiseptic auromatic [sic], etc.”
55  Previous work for Pratt involving elevator and 
escalator devices was what had led Pratt to return and suggest the deal for the differential 
motion valve.
56  Similarly, Katz had earlier used Van Winkle to file a patent for a shoe 
heel.
57 
Not surprisingly, Van Winkle devoted a great deal of his time to cultivating these 
kinds of personal relationships—not just with inventors but also with businessmen 
interested in investing in patents.   Van Winkle’s diary shows that he spent the bulk of 
each day receiving visitors, calling on people, and talking business over lunch and dinner 
at the Columbia Club or other similar places.  This constant round of face-to-face 
meetings helped Van Winkle build relationships of trust with parties on both sides of the 
market.  In addition, these meetings became an important source of tips about potential 
buyers for inventions, new technologies for Van Winkle to explore, and clients he might 
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attract to his practice.  Thus when Van Winkle was handling an elevator safety invention 
for Pratt, he received information from a friend with whom he often dined “that C. L. C. 
Howe of the N.Y. Life Co was looking for a safety for Elevators.”  Van Winkle called on 
Howe that very afternoon, noting in his diary that “There might be something doing 
later.”
58 On another occasion, he lunched with Charlie Halsey, who “said he had some 
cigarette machine patents + papers which he would bring to my office and let me look 
over.”
59 A similar lunch with Robert E. Booream, an inventor whose work embraced 
electric bridge hoists, washers for gold mining, and methods of roadway construction, 
yielded the notation that the two men had “lightly touched on business.  We will no doubt 
be associated.”
60  Van Winkle’s use of the word “associated” suggests that he envisioned 
his work with Booream to encompass more than simply filing patent applications,” and 
the diary entries show him later putting Booream in contact with a mining engineer.
61 
A few businessmen appeared over and over again in the pages of the diary as 
purchasers of, or investors in, patents.  One of the most striking things about these men is 
the wide variety of technologies in which they displayed an interest.  Richardson, for 
example, was involved in patents for hat-frame formers, rails for high-speed railroads, 
electric railroad systems, and pliers.
62  Another businessman, Arthur DeYoung, was in 
frequent contact to discuss technologies as diverse as coin counters, arc lamps, and dry 
mounting processes for photographs.
63  The most intriguing case is a man who is 
identified in the records only as Mr. Oliver, although he was closely associated with Van 
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Winkle in a number of important deals.  Oliver’s investments spanned the full gamut of 
technologies, from envelopes to drills to arc lamps to sewing machines to signaling 
systems for railroads.
64 
The wide variety of technologies in which these men were interested suggests that 
they were not primarily manufacturers seeking to purchase new inventions to improve the 
efficiency of their enterprises or expand their product lines.  Instead, they seem to have 
been functioning essentially as venture capitalists eager to profit from cutting-edge 
technologies by getting in on the ground floor.  Sometimes getting in on the ground floor 
simply meant purchasing the rights to promising new technologies.  Richardson, for 
example, typically operated this way.  Similarly, Oliver offered an inventor named Peters 
a note for $100,000 in exchange for the assignment of a patent for a wireless receiver—
after Oliver and Van Winkle had thoroughly discussed possible complications from the 
Deforrest Company, the value of foreign patents, and the likelihood of marketing the 
device to the U.S. government.
65 
Sometimes, however, getting in on the ground floor meant much more—meant 
actually organizing companies to develop and exploit an invention’s potential.  Van 
Winkle was involved in at least two such promotions during the period of the diary:  the 
Simplex Machine Company and the Automatic Security Signal Company.
66  Both efforts 
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concerned inventions patented by William M. Murphy, and in each case Van Winkle 
worked closely with Oliver.  These promotions suggest that the roles of patent agents as 
intermediaries could extend far beyond simply matching inventors with potential buyers 
of their patents.  Although Van Winkle did not handle the formal legal work associated 
with incorporation, he did everything else:  he brokered agreements between the inventor 
and the main investors, arranged for the inventor to assign his patents to the company, 
arranged for the application and sale of foreign patents, worked to find buyers for the 
companies’ securities and customers for the companies’ products, and even helped the 
inventor work out knotty technical details.
67  In exchange, he received payment in the 
form of shares in the new company’s stock.  In the case of Simplex, for example, he 
received 25 out of 500 shares; Murphy received 175.
68 
 Although we have no basis for assuming that Van Winkle was representative of 
the general population of patent lawyers, his diary nonetheless offers an intriguing 
window on the market for patented technology, allowing us to observe in close detail 
some of the ways in which patent attorneys might improve the efficiency of this kind of 
trade. The diary provides concrete evidence of the extensive investments that 
intermediaries had to make in cultivating the trust of participants on both sides of the 
market—the time and resources that had to be devoted to building personal relations with 
inventors and also with businessmen who were potential buyers of patented technology. 
The diary also highlights the very personal nature of many of the channels through which 
information about inventions flowed during this period.  Despite the existence of 
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publications that specialized in reporting new technological developments, the operation 
of the market for technology depended to a large extent on the circulation by word of 
mouth of details about new inventions that had not yet been fully worked out—details 
patent agents and lawyers were uniquely well placed both to obtain and assess. More 
interesting still, the diary opens a window on a world hitherto largely unknown—a world 
in which businessmen who were operating in effect as venture capitalists eagerly 
purchased interests in patents, and where attorneys like Van Winkle not only helped them 
by assessing the investment potential of new inventions, but also played a vital role in 
bringing businessmen and inventors together in companies formed to exploit these 
promising new technologies.    
Although much work needs to be done to assess the extent and importance of such 
activities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, evidence from 
interference records and other sources suggests that Van Winkle and his associates were 
by no means alone.  For example, Lansing Onderdonk, a sewing machine inventor, 
testified that he and patent attorney Henry P. Wells had been part of a group that had 
organized a business, in the early 1880s, to exploit a combination plaiting and ruffling 
attachment for sewing machines.
69  The president of the Bonsack Machine Company, 
Demetrius B. Strouse, was none other than the patent attorney who had filed James A. 
Bonsack’s original cigarette machine patents.
70  To give a final, but very suggestive 
example, patent lawyer Grosvenor Porter Lowrey played an important role in putting 
together financing for Thomas Edison’s work in electric lighting. Lowrey was a partner 
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in the firm of Porter, Lowrey, Soren & Stone and also general counsel for Western 
Union. In this latter capacity, he had handled a number of patents for Edison and had 
developed a close relationship with the inventor. Edison was thinking of working on 
electric lighting, but had put the idea aside because he could not see how to come up with 
the funding he needed for the project. Lowrey came to his aid by putting together “a 
syndicate of his friends and closest business associates,” including some of his legal 
partners, colleagues from Western Union, and personal friends such as the Fabbri 
brothers, partners in Drexel, Morgan & Company.  Financing from this group enabled 
Edison to create the primitive research lab at Menlo Park where he conducted his 
experiments with incandescent lighting. When the experiments proved successful, 




This essay has investigated the institutions that helped to make the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century such a fertile period in U.S. technological history.  As we have 
argued, the creation of a well-developed market for patented technology facilitated the 
emergence of a group of highly specialized and productive inventors by making it possible 
for them to transfer to others responsibility for developing and commercializing their 
inventions.  The most basic of the institutional supports that made this market possible was, 
of course, the patent system, which created secure and tradable property rights in invention. 
But, as we have argued, trade was also facilitated by the emergence of intermediaries who 
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economized on the information costs associated with assessing the value of inventions and 
helped to match sellers and buyers of patent rights.  Patent agents and lawyers were 
particularly well placed to provide these kinds of services, because they were linked to 
similar attorneys in other parts of the country and because, in the course of their regular 
business activities, they accumulated information about participants on both sides of the 
market for technology.   As our quantitative analysis of assignment contracts demonstrated, 
patentees whose assignments were handled by these specialists assigned a greater fraction 
of their patents and also were able to find buyers for their inventions much more quickly 
than other patentees. 
In the case of financial markets, scholars have argued that the emergence of banks 
and other similar kinds of formal intermediaries not only improved the efficiency with 
which capital was transferred from savers to investors, but also had a more profound effect 
on the economy by raising the general level of savings and investment.  Although we do 
not have the evidence we need to test formally whether levels of inventive activity were 
similarly spurred by the appearance of specialized intermediaries in the market for patents, 
our results provide at least circumstantial support for such a view. Thus we have shown 
that inventors who were most specialized in patenting (that is, had the greatest numbers of 
patents over a five-year period) and who were most involved in the market (that is, had 
assigned a higher fraction of these patents at issue) made the most extensive use of 
registered intermediaries.  Moreover, our analysis of the longitudinal “B” sample indicates 
that inventors who were most involved in the market both had the longest patenting careers 
and received the highest numbers of patent grants over their careers.  In other words, the 
development of institutions supporting market trade in patented technology seems to have   45
made it possible for creative individuals to specialize more fully in inventive work—that is, 
it seems to have set in motion the kind of Smithian process that generally has been 
associated with higher rates of productivity, in this case in the generation of new 
technological knowledge. 
 TABLE 1 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON ASSIGNMENTS MADE BEFORE  
AND AFTER ISSUE OF PATENTS 
 
 
  1870-71 1890-91 1910-11 
     
New  England     
  Assignment to Patenting Index    115.1    109.5    132.4 
  % Assigned After Issue    70.4    31.2    30.1 
  % Secondary Assignments    26.6    14.8    12.0 
  % Geographic Assignments    17.1    0.8    0.0 
     
Middle  Atlantic     
  Assignment to Patenting Index    100.7    94.8    116.3 
  % Assigned After Issue    70.9    44.4    37.9 
  % Secondary Assignments    33.3    16.4    11.0 
  % Geographic Assignments    19.1    1.9    0.7 
     
East North Central       
  Assignment to Patenting Index    96.3    118.1    104.9 
  % Assigned After Issue    77.7    48.5    32.8 
  % Secondary Assignments    18.1    18.4    11.8 
  % Geographic Assignments    34.3    5.7    1.8 
     
West North Central       
  Assignment to Patenting Index    90.7    110.1    73.5 
  % Assigned After Issue    77.4    48.6    42.6 
  % Secondary Assignments    32.3    19.2    11.0 
  % Geographic Assignments    41.9    13.0    2.6 
     
South     
  Assignment to Patenting Index    60.0    68.9    68.0 
  % Assigned After Issue    74.4    42.3    48.2 
  % Secondary Assignments    27.9    11.3    19.1 
  % Geographic Assignments    20.9    6.2    2.5 
     
West     
  Assignment to Patenting Index    150.0    67.2    81.5 
  % Assigned After Issue    59.1    57.4    36.0 
  % Secondary Assignments    22.7    11.4    10.4 
  % Geographic Assignments    18.2    7.4    1.2 
     
Total  Domestic     
  Assignment to Patenting Index    100.0    100.0    100.0   % Assigned After Issue    72.3    44.1    36.5 
  % Secondary Assignments    27.8    16.4    12.0 
  % Geographic Assignments    22.8    4.6    1.2 
     
  Assignments to Patents Ratio    0.83    0.71    0.71 
  Number of Contracts    794    1,373    1,869 
 
Sources and Notes:  Our sample consists of all assignment contracts filed with the Patent 
Office during the months of January 1871, January 1891, and January 1911.  These 
contracts are recorded in “Liber” volumes stored at the National Archives.  There are a 
total of about 4,600 contracts in our sample.  Only those involving assignors that resided 
in the United States are included in this table.  The assignment to patenting index is based 
on the ratio of assignments originating in the respective regions (given by the residence 
of the assignor) to the number of patents filed from that region in 1870, 1890, and 1910 
respectively.  In each year the index has been set so that the national average equals 100.  
The percentage of secondary assignments refers to the proportion of assignments where 
the assignor was neither the patentee nor a relative of the patentee.  The percentage of 
geographic patent assignments refers to the proportion of assignments where the right 
transferred was for a geographic unit smaller than the nation. TABLE 2 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PATENT ASSIGNMENT,  
BY CORRESPONDENT TYPE, 1871-1911 
 





















        
1871         
Number  Patents 114 144 126    53 
 Contracts    85    98    82    21 
          
% of Total Number  Patents  26.1  33.0  28.8    12.1 
  Contracts  29.7 33.9 29.4    7.0 
        
Proportion  Assigned  Patents 0.47 0.09 0.18  – 
  Before  Issue  Contracts  0.61 0.08 0.23  – 
        
Proportion  Secondary  Patents 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.85 
  Assignments  Contracts  0.20 0.31 0.30 0.80 
        
Proportion  National  Patents 0.89 0.53 0.71  – 
  Assignments  Contracts  0.89 0.51 0.70  – 
        
Proportion  Assigned  Patents 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.66 
  to  Company  Contracts  0.25 0.16 0.20 0.48 
        
Prop. Where Patentee   Patents  0.46  0.28  0.40  0.32 
  in County With   Contracts  0.39  0.31  0.35  0.38 
  City of >100,000           
        
Patentees’ Ave. 5-Yr.   Patents  3.90  3.73  3.35  4.69 
  Total of Patents   Contracts  2.45  3.10  3.27  3.05 
        
Patentees’ Ave. 5-Yr.   Patents  1.47  0.88  0.80  0.88 
  Total of Patents   Contracts  1.08  0.64  0.88  0.70 
  Assigned at Issue           
        
Ave. No. of Contracts           
  Assigned  by    Contracts  2.36 1.05 1.26  – 
  Correspondent        
 
 1891        
Number  Patents 336 188 235    69 
 Contracts  219    89    88    27 
          
% of Total Number  Patents  42.7  21.9  27.4    8.0 
  Contracts  51.8 21.0 20.8    6.4 
        
Proportion  Assigned  Patents 0.44 0.15 0.32 0.24 
  Before  Issue  Contracts  0.52 0.18 0.40 0.37 
        
Proportion  Secondary  Patents 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.81 
  Assignments  Contracts  0.13 0.25 0.23 0.78 
        
Proportion  National  Patents 0.91 0.78 0.86  – 
  Assignments  Contracts  0.94 0.72 0.78  – 
        
Proportion  Assigned  Patents 0.39 0.28 0.48 0.68 
  to  Company  Contracts  0.41 0.27 0.45 0.52 
        
Prop. Where Patentee   Patents  0.51  0.45  0.55  0.58 
  in County With   Contracts  0.46  0.45  0.48  0.52 
  City of >100,000           
        
Patentees’ Ave. 5-Yr.   Patents  6.61  3.65  5.80  5.45 
  Total of Patents   Contracts  4.90  3.43  5.17  3.00 
        
Patentees’ Ave. 5-Yr.   Patents  4.29  1.10  3.50  3.65 
  Total of Patents   Contracts  3.39  1.27  3.43  1.74 
  Assigned at Issue           
        
Ave. No. of Contracts           
  Assigned  by    Contracts  1.77 1.07 1.24  – 
  Correspondent        
 
1911        
Number Patents  467    94  189    89 
 Contracts  337    55  112    77 
          
% of Total Number  Patents  55.7    11.2  22.5  10.6 
 Contracts  58.1    9.5  19.2  13.2 
        
Proportion  Assigned  Patents 0.70 0.15 0.31  – 
  Before  Issue  Contracts  0.72 0.18 0.41  – 
        
Proportion  Secondary  Patents 0.15 0.28 0.31  – 
  Assignments  Contracts  0.09 0.24 0.21  –         
Proportion  National  Patents 0.97 0.69 0.89  – 
  Assignments  Contracts  0.97 0.69 0.92  – 
        
Proportion  Assigned  Patents 0.61 0.55 0.46  – 
  to  Company  Contracts  0.57 0.47 0.51  – 
        
Prop. Where Patentee   Patents  0.51  0.32  0.49  0.37 
  in County With   Contracts  0.50  0.40  0.43  0.39 
  City of >100,000           
        
Patentees’ Ave. 5-Yr.   Patents  6.92  2.28  3.76  2.96 
  Total of Patents   Contracts  4.99  2.45  4.04  3.13 
        
Patentees’ Ave. 5-Yr.   Patents  5.97  0.69  2.66  2.49 
  Total of Patents   Contracts  4.21  0.84  3.11  2.64 
  Assigned at Issue           
        
Ave. No. of Contracts           
  Assigned by   Contracts  1.72  1.04  1.24  – 
  Correspondent        
 
Sources and Notes:  The data were collected from the manuscript Digests of assignment 
contracts for patentees whose family names began with the letter “B.”  Our data set 
includes information on all such patent assignments filed with the Patent Office during 
the months of January through March for 1871, 1891, and 1911.  Because some contracts 
involved the sale or transfer of more than one patent, and some encompassed multiple 
transfers of the same patent (such as the sale of a patent from A to B, and then another  
transfer of the patent from B to C), we report one set of figures computed over all patents 
assigned and another set computed over all contracts.  For every patent in our sample of 
assignments, we compiled a five-year record of all of the patents received by the 
patentee, using the year of the assigned patent as the central year.  From this record, we 
computed the total number of patents the patentee received over the five years and the 
total number of these patents that he assigned at issue.  We categorized each assignment 
contract (and the patents it included) by the identity of the person to whom all 
correspondence about the assignments was to be addressed.  Working with lists of patent 
agents and lawyers from 1883 and 1905, we distinguished correspondents who were 
formally registered with the Patent Office in at least one of these two years as a separate 
class of intermediaries.  Correspondents who were principals to the contract (either the 
patentee, the assignor, or the assignee of one of the patents involved) were grouped 
together in a second category of intermediaries. A third category consisted of third parties 
who did not appear on either of the two lists of registered agents that we relied upon.  It 
seems likely, however, that we would have been able to identify some of these 
correspondents as registered agents if we had rosters for additional years.  Finally, we 
include an “unknown” category that is primarily composed of cases where multiple 
patents were assigned together and where the details of the contract were summarized in the record of another patentee whose family name began with a letter other than “B”—
and was thus in another Digest volume.    
TABLE 3 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSIGNMENTS BY DATE AND TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT 
AND BY CORRESPONDENT CLASS 
 






but Within 5 
Years 
Assignment 







             
    No. % No. % No. % No.  % 
                  
1871                  
Registered   Prim.   40   69.0   17    29.3    1    1.7   58   24.3 
 Patent  Agent  Sec.   5    13.2    26    68.4   7   18.4    38    23.3 
                    
Principal  Prim.   12   12.8   77    81.9    5    5.3   94   39.3 
  Sec.   0  –    39    86.7   6   13.3    45    27.6 
                  
Unregistered  Prim.   21   26.6   53    67.1    5    6.3   79   33.1 
 Third  Party  Sec.   0  –    31    81.6   7   18.4    38    23.3 
                  
Unknown  Prim.   0  –   6    75.0   2   25.0   8   3.4 
  Sec.   1   2.4    38    90.5   3    7.1    42    25.8 
                  
Total  Prim.   73   30.5  153    64.0   13    5.4  239   
  Sec.    6   3.7  134   82.2    23  14.1 163  
                  
1891                  
Registered  Prim. 141   48.3  127   43.5    24   8.2 292   50.3 
  Patent Agent  Sec.   20   27.0   40    54.1   14    18.9   74   27.1 
                  
Principal  Prim.   25   19.4   82    63.6   22    17.1  129   22.2 
  Sec.    4    6.8   27    45.8   28    47.5   59   21.6 
                  
Unregistered  Prim.   60   40.8   59    40.1   28    19.1  147   25.3 
  Third Party  Sec.   14   16.1   47    54.0   26    29.9   87   31.9 
                  
Unknown  Prim.   7    53.9   2    15.4   4   30.8    13   2.2 
  Sec.    9   17.0   28    52.8   16    30.2   53   19.4 
                  
Total  Prim. 233   40.1  270   46.5    78  13.4 581  
  Sec.   47   17.2  142    52.0   84    30.8  273   
                  
 1911                  
Registered  Prim.  231   76.5   57    18.9   14    4.6  303   63.7 
  Patent Agent  Sec.   19   33.9   25    44.6   12    21.4   56   43.4 
               
Principal  Prim.   12   18.8   40    62.5   12    18.8   64   13.5 
  Sec.   1   4.6    17    77.3   4   18.2    22    17.1 
               
Unregistered  Prim.   46   42.6   45    41.7   17    15.7  108   22.8 
  Third Party  Sec.    4    7.8   36    70.6   11    21.6   51   39.5 
               
Total  Prim. 289   61.0    142   30.0    43   9.1 474  
  Sec.   24   18.6   78    60.5   27    20.9  129   
                  
 
Sources:  See Table 2. 
 
Notes:  The unit of analysis in this table is the patent.  For 1911, we omit the unknown 
category because we have no information on the assignments as well as on the 
correspondents for those cases. TABLE 4 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS BY THE FIVE-YEAR TOTAL OF PATENTS 
RECEIVED BY THE INVENTOR AND BY THE NUMBER OF 
 CONTRACTS HANDLED BY THE CORRESPONDENT 
 
 
      
      Number of Contracts Handled by Correspondent 
           
     1  2-3  4-5  6+  Total 
         
1871  Patentees  with         
  1  Patent  Number  64 18  5  12 99 
   Row  %  65  18  5  12   
    Col.  %  36 37 29 52 37 
           
 2-3  Patents  Number  73  17  6  10  106 
   Row  %  69  16  6  9   
    Col.  %  41 35 35 43 39 
           
  4+  Patents  Number  43  14 6  1 64 
   Row  %  67  22  9  2   
    Col.  %  24 29 35  4  24 
           
  Total  Number  180 49  17  23 269 
   Row  %  67  18  6  9   
           
1891  Patentees  with         
 1  Patent  Number  79  24  3  10  116 
   Row  %  68  21  3  9   
    Col.  %  35 23 10 26 29 
           
  2-3  Patents  Number  66 31 14 19  130 
    Row  %  51 24 11 15   
    Col.  %  30 30 48 50 33 
           
  4+  Patents  Number  78 50 12  9 149 
   Row  %  52  34  8  6   
    Col.  %  35 48 41 24 38 
           
  Total  Number  223  105 29  38 395 
   Row  %  56  27  7  10   
           
1911  Patentees  with         
  1  Patent  Number  137  35 23  9 204     Row  %  67 17 11  4   
    Col.  %  48 27 37 21 39 
           
  2-3  Patents  Number  83 32 13  3 131 
    Row  %  63 24 10  2   
    Col.  %  29 25 21  7  25 
           
  4+  Patents  Number  64 61 27 30  182 
    Row  %  35 34 15 16   
    Col.  %  23 48 43 71 35 
           
  Total  Number  284  128 63  42 517 
    Row  %  55 25 12  8   
           
 
Notes and Sources:  See Table 2. TABLE 5 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSIGNED PATENTS BY CORRESPONDENT TYPE AND BY 
PROPORTION OF PATENTEE’S FIVE-YEAR PATENTS  












































            
1871            
0   10   13.7   17    23.3   20   27.4   26   35.6   73   46.5
0+ to 0.2    0  –    3   30.0    4   40.0   3   30.0    10    6.4
0.2+ to 0.4   11   29.7    19   51.4    6   16.2   1    2.7    37   23.6
0.4+ to 0.6    5   29.4    5   29.4    7   41.2   0  –    17   10.8
> 0.6   10   50.0    4    20.0    6   30.0   0  –   20   12.7
Total   36   22.9    48    30.6   43   27.4   30   19.1  157   
            
            
1891            
0   40   28.4    57    40.4   33   23.4   11    7.8  141   27.6
0+ to 0.2    9   25.7    4   11.4   16   45.7   6   17.1    35    6.9
0.2+ to 0.4   14   28.6    12   24.5   19   38.8   4    8.2    49    9.6
0.4+ to 0.6   20   37.7    8    15.1   15   28.3   10   18.9   53   10.4
>  0.6  134   57.5    21   9.0    56   24.0   22   9.4  233   45.6
Total  217   42.5    102   20.0  139   27.2   53   10.4  511  
            
            
1911               
0   26   44.8    10    17.2   20   34.5   2    3.5   58    9.3
0+ to 0.2    4   33.3    4   33.3    4   33.3   0  –    12    1.9
0.2+ to 0.4    8   57.1    0  –    4   28.6   2   14.3    14    2.2
0.4+  to  0.6    17    73.9  2    8.7   3    13.0   1   4.4   23   3.7
> 0.6  275   66.6   19    4.6   66   16.0   53   12.8  520   82.9
Total  330   52.6    35   5.6    97   15.5   58   9.3  627  
            
 
Sources:  See Table 2. 
 
Notes:  The unit of analysis in this table is the patent.  For each patent, the proportion of 
five-year patents assigned at issue was calculated by subtracting from the patentees’ five-year total the patent originally sampled from the digest of assignment contracts and then 
computing for the remaining patents the proportion assigned at issue. TABLE 6 
 
ASSIGNMENT OF PATENTS AT ISSUE, 1870-1911 
 
 
  1870-71 1890-91 1910-11 
     
Number of Patents    1,563    2,031    2,512 
     
%  of Patents Assigned    18.4      29.3      31.1 
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Sources and Notes:  The table is based on three random cross-sectional samples of 
patents drawn from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the years 1870-
71, 1890-91, 1910-11.  The three samples total slightly under 6,600 patents, including 
those granted to foreigners.  The table includes only patents awarded to residents of the 
United States. The category “% of Assignments to Group Including Patentee” consists of 
patents assigned to one or more individuals including the patentee, an individual with the 
same family name as the patentee, or an individual specifically designated as an agent for 
the patentee.  Patents assigned to companies with the same last name as the patentee were 
included in the general category of patents assigned to companies, as well as in the 
particular category of companies with the same name as the patentee.  It is, of course, 
also possible that patentees had an ownership stake in companies that did not bear their 
name. TABLE 7 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE CAREERS OF PATENTEES  
IN THE “B” SAMPLE 
 
  1870-71 1890-91 1910-11  Total 
      
  Means Computed Over Patentees 
Not Assigned at Issue         
  Ave. No. of Patents    8.0    10.0    6.4    7.9 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    13.2    14.7    11.1    12.7 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    8.3    11.5    9.2    9.6 
  Number of Patentees    121    117    178    416 
  Percent of All Patentees    84.6    63.9    75.7    74.2 
      
Share  Assignment      
  Ave. No. of Patents    5.4    11.1    2.6    6.9 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    10.6    13.5    8.1    11.0 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    67.1    75.3    87.5    76.7 
  Number of Patentees    13    19    14    46 
  Percent of All Patentees    9.1    10.4    6.0    8.2 
      
Full Assign. to Individual         
  Ave. No. of Patents    5.3    29.0    3.0    12.1 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    12.0    18.3    5.3    11.9 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    52.1    74.1    76.4    66.7 
  Number of Patentees    7    6    6    19 
  Percent of All Patentees    4.9    3.3    2.6    3.4 
      
Full Assign. to Company         
  Ave. No. of Patents    30.0    23.7    32.6    28.0 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    25.5    21.7    23.5    22.6 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    62.1    70.7    80.9    75.2 
  Number of Patentees    2    41    37    80 
  Percent of All Patentees    1.4    22.4    15.7    14.3 
      
      
  Means Computed Over Patents 
Not Assigned at Issue         
  Ave. No. of Patents    20.0    39.7    38.2    33.7 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    21.5    28.2    26.0    25.6 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    14.2    23.5    22.0    20.4 
  Number of Patents    900    1264    1053    3217 
  Percent of All Patents    80.0    50.1    43.8    53.1 
      
Share  Assignment        Ave. No. of Patents    19.3    40.5    24.4    30.7 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    20.7    27.5    25.6    25.4 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    39.9    66.5    62.8    59.4 
  Number of Patents    75    156    108    339 
  Percent of All Patents    6.6    6.2    4.5    5.6 
      
Full Assign. to Individual         
  Ave. No. of Patents    27.3    76.5    39.2    58.6 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    26.1    30.6    28.3    29.2 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    40.3    77.0    70.9    67.9 
  Number of Patents    82    224    74    381 
  Percent of All Patents    7.3    8.9    3.1    6.2 
      
Full Assign. to Company         
  Ave. No. of Patents    35.9    62.5    135.6    101.8 
  Length of Career (Yrs.)    26.6    32.9    35.1    33.9 
  Career Assign. Rate (%)    53.3    78.0    85.5    81.3 
  Number of Patents    73    880    1168    2121 
  Percent of All Patents    6.5    34.9    48.6    35.0 
 
Sources and Notes:  The table is based on a longitudinal data set constructed by selecting 
all of the patentees in the cross-sectional samples (see Table 6 for a description) whose 
family names began with the letter “B” and collecting information from the Annual 
Reports of the Commissioner of Patents on the patents they received during the twenty-
five years before and after they appeared in the samples.  This data set contains 
information on 6,057 patents granted to 561 “B” inventors.  The top panel treats each 
patentee as a single case, based on the patent that appeared in the cross-section.  The 
bottom panel analyzes each patent obtained by the patentee separately.  Patentees are 
divided into categories depending on whether the patent in the original cross-section was 
assigned at issue or not and how that assignment was made.  The career assignment rate 
includes only assignments at issue. 
 
 